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*^«<iSo.r} HOUSE OF EEPRESENTATIVES {"no^so^ 



MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES 



UP 26 
.P2 
1912 
Copy 1 



.ETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF "WAR 

TRANSMITTING 

IN RESPONSE TO HOUSE RESOLUTION 
NO. 343, INFORMATION CONCERNING 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOBILE 
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE NAMES OF ARMY POSTS WHICH 
HAVE BEEN LOCATED IN THEIR 
PRESENT SITUATIONS FOR REASONS 
WHICH ARE NOW TOTALLY OBSOLETE 



i 



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January 29, 1912.— Referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the 
War Department and ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 

1912 



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1 



DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



Office of the Secretary of War, 

Washington, January 25, 1912. 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Washington, D. C. 
Sir: In compliance vnt\\ the request contamed in House resolution 
343 I have the honor to submit the following information covering 
the statements made in my annual report for the year 1911, concern- 
ing the distribution of the mobile Army of the United States. 

(1) The names of all Army posts which have been located in their 
present situations for reasons which are now totally obsolete: 

Fort Apache, Ariz.,' established 1870, to protect the settlements against raids of 
Apache Indians. 

Boise Barracks, Idaho, established 1863, to protect emigrant trains against the 
Shoshone Indians. 

Fort Clark, Tex., established 1853, to guard the San Antonio and Eagle Pass 
wagon road and for the protection of the Rio Grande border against depredations by- 
Mexicans and Indians. 

Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., established 1867, to protect the Union Pacific Railroad 
in this vicinity and the lines of travel south to Denver and north to Fort Laramie and 
beyond from attacks by the Arapahoe Indians. 

Fort Douglas, Utah, established 1858, on account of trouble with the Mormons and 
to prevent depredations by Indians along the line of the overland mail route. 

Fort Huachuca, Ariz., established 1881, for protection against depredations by 
Indians and cattle thieves. 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., established 1827, as an outpost to protect the Santa Fe 
trail against Indians, principally the Delawares and Pawnees. 

Fort Mackenzie, Wyo., established 1898, as a central post in the vicinity of the 
large Indian reservations of Wyoming, Montana, and South Dakota, including the 
Crows, Northern Cheyenues, Shoshones, Sioux, and the Brules. The establishment 
of this post enabled old Forts Custer and Washakie to be abandoned. 

Fort Meade, S. Dak., established 1878 to protect citizens of the Black Hills country 
from hostile attacks of the Sioux and other Indian tribes congregating in or inhabiting 
that locality. 

Fort Missoula, Mont., established 1877 as a restraint upon Flathead Indians living in 
the vicinity. 

Fort Riley, Kans., established 1853 to protect the advancing line of settlement 
toward the new territory acquired in the southwest as a result of the Mexican War. 

Fort Robinson, Nebr., established 1874 near the Red Cloud Indian Agency, around 
which were gathered about 12,000 Indians, mainly Ogalala, Sioux, Cheyennes, and 
Arapahoes. 

Fort Sill, Okla., established 1869 as the base of operation against the hostile Chey- 
ennes and Kiowa . 

Fort Snelling, Minn., established 1820 as an extreme outpost in the Indian country. 

While all these posts were established for reasons that are now 
obsolete, new conditions have since arisen which may require the con- 
tinuance of a number of them. 

1 A possibility of Indian trouble still exists. 



4, THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

(2) The names of all Army posts which have been located in their 
present situations for reasons which were from the beginning purely 
local : 

This includes most of the posts which were established for Indian 
troubles, most of which were purely local. 



Fort Apache, Ariz. 
Boise Barracks, Idaho. 
Fort Clark, Tex. 
Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo. 



Fort Meade, S. Dak. 
Fort Missoula, Mont. 
Fort Robinson, Nebr. 
Fort Sill, Okla. 
Whipple Barracks, Ariz. 



(3) The names of all Army posts which were originally placed where 
they are with reference to possible Indian troubles, and the names of 
such of these as may be placed where such troubles now are no 
longer possible : 



Boise Barracks, Idaho. 
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo. 
Fort Douglas, Utah. 
Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo. 
Fort Meade, S. Dak. 



Fort Missoula, Mont. 
Fort Riley, Kans. 
Fort Robinson, Nebr, 
Fort Sill, Okla. 
Fort Snelling, Minn. 



Forts Clark and Huachuca were established not only with reference 
to possible Indian troubles, but to meet the possibility of cattle 
raids across the border. 

(4) The names of all Army posts which are situated in positions 
suited to meet the strategic needs of national action or defense; and 
(7) the present intention of the War Department with respect to 
recommending legislation with a view to putting an end to the present 
extravagant distribution of the Army, and the steps, if any, already 
taken or now being taken by the department in preparing such recom- 
mendations. 

It is deemed essential to discuss these two requirements together 
for the reason that a study of the subject of the distribution of the 
Army to meet the strategic needs of national action or defense neces- 
sarily involves also a careful consideration of the subject of economy 
of administration and supply. The two are inseparable, and any list 
submitted in accordance with the fourth requirement as given above 
would convey little meaning unless accompanied by an outline of the 
policy and intention that dictated such selection. 

A careful study of the organization and distribution of the mobile 
forces of the Regular Army, both at home and abroad, is now being 
made by a committee of the General Staff. This subject is being con- 
sidered in great detail, and upon the completion of this work and its 
approval by the Secretary of War, it will represent the complete 
policy of the War Department in this regard. 

In the preparation of this study it is assumed: 

First. That the strength of the mobile Army is to be the minimum 
consistent with present requirements. 

Second. That with the troops available, adequate forces must be 
provided for our foreign garrisons, bearing in mind the distinct tactical 
mission that each has to perform in case of war. As it is very proba- 
ble that these organizations can not be augmented by reenforcements 
from the United States after the outbreak of hostiliues, it is essential 
that they be kept at full war strength at all times. 

Third. That with the remainder a mobile force is to be organized 
and strategically distributed within the United States. 



THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 5 

This study is therefore proceeding in the following logicnl order: 

1. 'A determination of the mobile forces immediately required for 
the defense of the Philippines, Panama, Oahu, Porto Rico, and 
Alaska. 

2. A determination of the most effective and economical means of 
establishing these foreign garrisons with the mobile forces now 
organized or authorized by Congress. 

3. Plans for the organization of the mobile forces not required for 
foreign service into a field army at home, even though the troops 
now available for this purpose he inadequate for the completion of 
the necessary tactical and administrative miits. 

4. A determination of the regular mobile forces necessary for the 
full military security of the United States, with a view to indicating 
the further refoims that must wait upon the action of Congress. 

This study, in so far as it concerns the Philippines garrison, has 
been completed and the recommendations contained therein have 
been approved by the Secretary of War, who is now taking steps to 
inaugurate the changes proposed, it is expected, without going 
beyond the current appropriations. 

The details in regard to the organization and distribution of that 
portion of the mobile Army remaining within the territorial hmits of 
the United States after the necessary detachments have been made 
for foreign service have not been worked out as yet, but the general 
conclusions of the board may be briefly summarized as follows : 

If the mobile Army is to be efficient its distribution must meet the 
following requirements : 

1. It must be favorable for the tactical training of the three arms 
combined (Infantry, Cavalry, and Field ArtiUery). 

2. It must be favorable for the rapid concentration of the Army 
upon our northern or southern frontier or upon our eastern or western 
seaboard. 

3. It must favor the best use of the Army as a model for the general 
military training of the National Guard. 

4. It must favor the use of the Regular Army as a nucleus for the 
war organization of the National Guard and such volunteer forces as 
Congress may authorize to meet any possible mifitary emergency. 

5. The distribution must favor economical adnunistration with the 
view of developing the maximum return for the money appropriated 
for military purposes. 

6. The distribution must permit a peace organization which will 
also be effective in war; that is, an organization which wall permit a 
prompt expansion in time of war by means of a system of reserves. 

These requirements can best be met by correcting the present 
dispersion of the mobile Army. The mobile Army is now scattered 
in 49 posts. It should be segregated into detachments of all arms, 
each of which can.be readily assembled for team training by reasonable 
marches of concentration. Each of the several tactical groups should 
be stationed in the vicinity of strategic centers where facilities are 
favorable for transportation, administration, and supply. The exact 
location of these centers should depend upon a careful study of many 
considerations, but they may be approximately indicated as follows: 

1. Two, and possibly three, groups on the fine between the St. 
Lawrence and Atlanta, covering the Atlantic seaboard. 



b THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

2. Two and possibly three groups on the line between Puget Sound 
and Los Angeles, covering the Pacific seaboard. 

3. At least two groups between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande 
serving as first reserves for either seaboard and as nuclei for the devel- 
opment of the National Guard and volunteer forces to be organized in 
the interior of the continent. 

The number of groups to be organized is primarily restricted by 
the total strength of the mobile Army. No group should contain less 
than a brigade of Infantry with a proper proportion of Cavahy, Field 
Artillery, and special troops, and at least one group should contain 
a full tactical division. Proper tactical training demands the com- 
bined use of the three arms, and this can be secured only by massing 
the troops of each group in a single post or in several posts within 
marching distance of a common center. Without such concentration 
joint training can not be secured except at heavy expense for trans- 
portation. In addition to these detachments of all arms, there should 
be at least two independent Cavalry brigades. 

A study of the question indicates that the stationing of our present 
mobile Army in more than eight or possibly nine such groups would 
be inconsistent with the demands of maximum economy and tactical 
efficiency. 

The solution of this problem is apparently complicated by the fact 
that the posts now occupied by the mobile Army represent a large 
investment which must be abandoned if an efficient plant is to be 
established. But while most of the posts now occupied have lost 
their military value, the national military reservations have acquired 
a great value as real estate. As a business proposition it should be 
possible to refund the investment and largely finance the relocation 
of the Army from the proceeds of the sale of the real estate wiiich is no 
longer needed for military purposes. The project would be similar in 
many respects to the Reclamation Service as now established by Con- 
gress. In that service a fund is formed from the proceeds of the sale 
of certain public lands, and from this fund certain approved projects 
are successively executed under general rules prescribed by Congress. 

It is believed that the Army can in this way be scientifically dis- 
tributed at an expense little if any in excess of the proceeds of the 
sales of the properties to be abandoned. 

Studies at the War College indicate that if the present mobile 
Army were concentrated in eight posts, its cost would be reduced by 
about $5,500,000 per annum. In six years this saving would pay 
for the new quartering of the mobile Army, even if nothing could be 
realized from the sale of real estate no longer needed. 

Having in view a distribution for military efficiency and economy, it 
may be said that the following posts are so located as to permit their 
being retained as nuclei or elements of strategic concentration groups: 

Fort Porter, Buffalo, N. Y. — A large post or group of posts in the 
Buffalo or Albany region would meet all of the requirements referred 
to on page 5. 

There is no post at Albany at present. To concentrate all of the 
mobile troops allotted to the North Atlantic seaboard at this place 
would tend to produce the maximum effectiveness of the troops, and 
the maximum economy of administration and supply. The radia- 
tion of railways from Albany would facilitate the dispatch of all or 



THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 7 

part of this force to any possible theater of operations in the North 
Atlantic region. 

But the exact location of such a center of future concentration can 
only be made after a detailed study of the whole region with special 
reference to facilities for training. While Albany appears to possess 
the greatest sum of advantages in the North Atlantic region, it should 
be noted that the railways radiating from Buffalo are more numerous 
and lead toward Chesapeake Bay as well as toward New York and 
New England. It is safe to say that the troops in the North Atlantic 
region should be located on the general area between Buffalo and 
Albany, but the ultimate sohition of the problem must rest upon a 
full consideration of all economic and strategic factors, and it can 
not be safely predicted at this time. If all or part of the troops in 
this region should ultimately be stationed in the vicinity of Buffalo 
Fort Porter, or some site near Bufl'alo, to be exchanged for Fort 
Porter, would have undoubted strategic value. After the determi- 
nation of such a center, every step toward the concentration of troops 
at that center would be a step toward economy, tactical efficiency, 
and strategic effectiveness. 

Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. — Near Chattanooga, Tenn. A desirable cen- 
ter, especially for a Cavalry brigade. 

Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Ga. — A desirable center on account of 
the strategic location of Atlanta with reference to the South Atlantic 
and Gulf coasts. 

Fort Sam Houston, Tex. — The best strategic position for the south- 
ern frontier. 

Fort Lawton, Wash, {near Seattle), and Vanxiouver Barracks, Wash, 
{near Portland). — These posts are near the center of the Puget Sound 
strategic group, and one or both of them may be retained as stations 
in the group. 

The Presidio of San Francisco, Cat., and the Presidio of Monterey, 
Cal. — One or both of these posts may properly be included in the 
California strategic group. 

In each of the following groups one or more posts may properly be 
retained as nuclei or elements of strategic concentration centers: 

Group I: Fort Benianmi Harrison, Ind.; Columbus Barracks, 
Ohio; Fort Sheridan, 111. 

As one of the future concentration groups should be in the geo- 
graphical region occupied by these posts, one or more of them may be 
retained as stations in the group. 

Maximum economy and effectiveness would no doubt be secured by 
concentrating all of the troops in the region in one post or in a group 
of posts at one center of population, but practical considerations may 
prevent the full attainment of this ideal. The ultimate determina- 
tion of the center must wait upon a more detailed study of the region. 
If the general concentration is approved, this region should be studied 
by a special board of officers with instructions to report upon the most 
advantageous location of posts, the reasons for such locations, and the 
extent to which existing posts can be retained without prejudice to 
the economic and military interests of the Government. 

Group II : Fort Des Moines, Iowa ; Fort Crook, Nebr. ; Fort Omaha, 
Nebr. ; Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Fort Riley, Kans.; Fort Sneffing. 
Minn.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo. 



8 THE MOBILE AKMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

As one of the future concentration groups should be in the geo- 
graphical region occupied by these posts, one or more of them may 
be retained as stations in the group. 

Maximum economy and effectiveness would no doubt be secured by 
concentrating all of the troops in the region in one post or in a group 
of posts at one center of population, but practical considerations may 
prevent the full attainment of the ideal. The ultimate determination 
of the center must wait upon a more detailed study of the region. If 
the general concentration is approved, this region sliould be studied 
by a special board of officers with instructions to report upon the most 
advantageous location of posts, the reasons for such locations, and the 
extent to which existmg posts can be retained without prejudice to 
the economic and military interests of the Government. 

In this group Fort Omaha, Fort Crook, Fort Des Moines, and Fort 
Leavenworth are each about 100 miles from a common center. 

Fort Snelling and Jefferson Barracks are too distant from the other 
posts of the group to permit of concentration with the other units of 
the group for instructional purposes. Efficiency demands therefore 
that they should not be retained unless it is decided to make them 
stations for detachments of ail arms. Fort Riley, with its reserva- 
tion of 19,000 acres, will serve as a suitable station for a cavalry 
brigade and if used for this purpose will be near enough to the other 
stations of the group. 

The following posts can not be included in the general system of 
strategic centers, but should be retained for the special reasons indi- 
cated in each case. 

Fort Sill, Olcla. — The large reservation available at this station is 
peculiarly adapted for use as a school of Artillery and musketry fire. 

Fort Bliss, Tex., and Fort Huachuca, Ariz.— The retention of these 
posts as Cavalry subposts on the southern border will probably be 
necessary for some time. 

Fort Myer, Va. — It will probably be necessary to retain a small 
garrison near the National Capital for escort duty and other cere- 
monial purposes. 

(5) The names of all posts which have been constructed during the 
10 years ending June 30, 1911, upon a plan which involved maximum 
initial cost of construction and maximum cost of maintenance in 
money and men; the amounts expended on such posts, respectively, 
for construction purposes during the said period, and what military 
necessity, if any, suggested the construction of such posts: 

Cost of con- 
Names of posts: struction. 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind $1, 202, 966. 71 

Fort Davis, Alaska 76, 936. 36 

Fort Des Moines, Iowa 1, 377, 404. 90 

Fort Liscum, Alaska 87, 321. 18 

Fort Oglethorpe, Ga 1, 499, 884. 13 

Presidio of Monterey, Cal 377, 263. 97 

Fort Sill, Okla. (new post) 1,255,288.30 

Fort Wm. H. Seward, Alaska 662,539.85 

Total 6, 539, 605. 40 

The names of all other posts where any construction work has 
been carried on during the 10 years ending June 30, 1911, upon a 
plan which involved maximum initial cost of construction and 



THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



maximum cost of maintenance in money and men; the amounts 
expended on such posts, respectively, for construction purposes dur- 
ing the said period and what military necessity, if any, suggested 
the new construction : 



Names of posts: 

Fort Apache, Ariz 

Fort Bliss, Tex. 

Boise Barracks, Idaho 

Fort Brady, Mich 

Fort Clark , Tex 

Fort Crook, Nebr 

FortD. A. Russell, Wyo 

Fort Douglas, Utah 

Fort Ethan Allen, Vt 

Fort George Wright, Wash 

Fort Gibbon, Alaska 

Fort Huachuca, Ariz 

Fort Jay , N . Y 

Fort Lawton, Wash 

Fort Lep.venworth, Kans 

Fort Lincoln, N. Dak 

Fort Logan H . Roots, Ark 

Fort Mackenzie, Wyo 

Madison Barracks, N. Y 

Fort Mason, Cal 

Fort Mcintosh, Tex 

Fort McPherson, Ga 

Fort Meade, S. Dak 

Fort Missoula, Mont 

Fort Myer, Va 

Fort Niagara, N. Y 

Fort Ontario, N. Y 

Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y 

Fort Porter, N . Y 

Presidio of San Francisco (Infantry cantonment). 

Fort Riley, Kans 

Fort Robinson, Nebr 

Fort St. Michael, Alaska 

Fort Sam Houston, Tex 

Fort Sheridan, 111 

Fort Snelling, Minn 

Vancouver Barracks, Wash 

Fort Wayne, Mich 

Whipple Barracks, Ariz 

Fort Wm. H. Harrison, Mont 

Fort Yellowstone, Wyo 



Cost orcinfltrjctlon. 



$40 
204 
36J 
211 
18 
328 

4,893 
730 
93 
530 
155 
88 
213 
503 

3, 705 
530 
212 

1, 120 
331 
123 
162 
526 
995 
551 
878 
272, 
548 
253 
21 
308 

2,590 

648 

46 

2,610 
941 

1,464 
879 
331 
568 
137 
659 



,112.62 
, 849. 12 
, 625. 48 
, 088. 28 
, 679. 55 
, 400. 23 
,164.29 
, 123. 72 
, 674. 97 
, 989. 78 
, 294. 07 
, 602. 83 
, 592. 84 
, 013. 36 
, 763. 96 
, 839. 34 
, 257. 99 
, 268. 50 
, 285. 92 
, 130. 09 
, 937. 55 
, 227. 46 
, 335. 36 
, 478. 30 
, 712. 86 
, 012. 50 
, 907. 30 
, 822. 99 
, 813. 47 
, 056. 88 
, 988. 03 
, 903. 88 
, 355. 50 
, 531. 63 
, 815. 23 
, 852. 73 
, 632. 50 
, 954. 95 
, 130. 60 
, 972. 02 
, 604. 02 



Total 30, 645, 797. 76 

While in some cases only a small amount has been expended on 
construction, the plan in all has been that of a scattered garrison 
involving maximum expense for sewer, water, light, and communica- 
tion systems and the maximum cost in money and men for mainte- 
nance and protection. 

The new construction mentioned in this paragraph was made 
necessary to provide additional shelter for the Army which had been 
greatly increased under the act of Congress, approved February 2, 
1901, and to replace old buildings. 

(6) The specific steps taken by the several Secretaries of War 
during the period of 10 years ending June 30, 1911, to prevent unnec- 
essary expenditures and impairment of efficiency caused by ill- 
advised location and construction of posts and inefficient distribu- 
tion of the mobile Army, and the reasons, as far as they can be 



10 THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, 

assigned, why the successive heads of the War Departjaient have 
been unsuccessful in preventing unnecessary expenditures and 
impairment of efficiency: 

In 1901 Secretary Root decided that a more concentrated system 
of garrisoning the mobile Army was necessary for economical admin- 
istration and efficient training. Accordingly, he appointed a board of 
general officers to consider and make recommendations on the subject. 

The failure of this effort is easily traceable to three causes. 

First. Lack of appreciation on part of the Army itself of the 
importance of concentration. 

The Army leaders had grown old under a system of scattered posts 
due to former Indian troubles. The board of general officers recom- 
mended 52 of the 65 Army posts for permanent occupation, 13 for 
temporary occupation, and the establishment of 7 new posts. Army 
Regulations stated nothing as to the importance of combined ma- 
neuvers, but dwelt strongly on the post commander's duty to make 
his post " an attractive home for the Army by every means available." 
For years a beautiful parklike reservation had been the surest 
means of gaining for the commanding officer favorable mention at 
the annual inspection. There had been no General Staff to consider 
the needs of the Army as a whole, no Chief of Staff to coordinate 
the idea of progressive subordinates and recommend the proper 
course of action. As a whole, the Army was not aware of its own 
shortcomings. 

Second. The necessity for housing troops returning from the 
Phffippine Islands. 

The termination of active hostilities was permitting the return of 
many troops who had to be cared for. This led the board to recom- 
mend for temporary occupation 13 posts that were slated for ulti- 
mate abandonment. Had the troops been made to live at these 
posts, despite the poor condition of many, with the minimum expen- 
diture possible for repairs until large concentrated posts had been 
built, millions would have been saved. But, as stated, no definite 
idea of concentration existed, and great pressure was brought to 
bear to make the existing posts comfortable. The matter of aban- 
donment was in abeyance, and in the reconstruction of posts ulti- 
mate economy was sought by making the buildings of a more durable 
type — brick, stone, and concrete. Had this been done at a concen- 
trated post the end sought would have been gained, but unfortunately 
the "beautiful park" idea was still in the ascendant, and the Army 
was saddled with the expense of maintenance of extensive roads, 
walks, gardens, lawns, and systems of lighting, water supply, and 
sewerage. Buildings of a type now recognized as extravagant were 
constructed. The lighting and heating of the quarters became a 
severe drain upon the officers' pay, until Congress came to their relief 
and authorized an allowance of fuel and Rght. 

The amounts expended upon these posts became an argument 
against their abandonment. It seemed wrong to spend large sums 
of money to make a post habitable, then to withdraw the troops. 
Throughout the last 10 years records show this argument recurring 
to prevent recommended concentration being effected, while good 
money was thrown after bad, perpetuating the very conditions wnich 
it was desired to avoid, the pressure of immediate needs being always 
greater than the pressure for a distant and more or less indefinite 



THE MOBILE ABMY OP THE UNITED STATES. 11 

policy. Doubtless tliis argument will again be used to prevent the 
concentration desired by the present Secretary of War, and unless 
approached in the spirit of a great business corporation which ruth- 
lessly tears down a six-story building no longer suited to its needs 
to erect the 20-story building found necessary, the present movement 
for an efficient and economically administered Army will fail as have 
preceding efforts. 

Third. Local and political influences. 

Scarcely had Mr. Root appointed liis board when the War Depart- 
ment was deluged with letters protestmg against the abandonment 
of certain posts, urging the extension of others, and recommending 
the establishment of new. These letters were from private citizens, 
from boards of trade, from city councils, from mayors, from gover- 
nors and from Members of Congress. The reasons urged ^ varied from 
"the people of this community are peaceful, law-abiding, hospitable, 
and patriotic " to "there are 40,000 Indians near this point " and from 
"a beautiful site wdtli 17 railroads radiating in every direction" to 
"we would find it hard to square ourselves with the community if 
our promises are not made good." 

It seems impossible to judge the effect these letters and certain 
resolutions of Congress may have had upon the board and upon the 
War Department; a careful reading of the record and the results 
indicate it to have been great. We find in addition to the enlarge- 
ment of many posts the following posts established mthout the 
recommendation of the board: Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.; Fort 
Des Moines, Iowa; Fort Seward, Alaska; Presidio of Monterey, Cal.; 
and Whipple Barracks, Ariz. Of these posts the first two were 
established by act of Congress. 

Throughout his incumbency as Secretary of War, Mr. Root con- 
tinued to represent the advisability of concentration, and actually 
effected it in Porto Rico. Our present large posts were started dur- 
ing those years, enabling better training to be given a portion of the 
mobile Army, but the abandonment of small posts made little prog- 
ress. It is known that he urgently fought the reestablishment of 
Whipple Barracks, Ariz., and asked that the appropriation be stricken 
from the sundry civil bill, as it would compel him "to throw away 
$50,000 against his official judgment." Nevertheless, the post was 
reestablished and over half a million expended in rebuilding it. It 
accommodates a battalion of Infantry (peace strength) . The same 
amount would build about one-fourth of a concentrated post for a 
brigade. Fifteen thousand dollars have been spent on repairs at 
this post during the past three years. 

In 1905, the Secretary of War (Mr. Taft) urged the abandonment 
of posts smaller than a battalion. He brought forward the idea also 
of permanent stations for units and the discontinuance of frequent 
changes of stations. The tactical concentration of troops for training 
of the three arms combined had not yet been thought of, nor had 
it yet been appreciated that the enfisted man wanted to be a soldier 
instead of a laborer. 

In 1906 Mi\ Taft made the recommendation for the Army to be 
concentrated in brigades and regimental posts. He made defiiiite 
reconnnendations for six brigade posts, ana stated that there should 

1 See H. Doc. No. 018, 57th Cong., pp. 399. 503, 626, 672. 



12 THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

be eight in all. It is noted that prior expenditures governed his 
selection, as four of the posts recommended were those on which the 
greatest amounts had been expended. The garrisons were with- 
drawn from eight of the smaller posts in 1905 and 1906. 

While it does not relate to the mobile Army, it should be mentioned 
that during Mr. Taft's period as Secretary of War the concentration 
idea was put in operation in the Coast Artillery, many small posts 
being left in charge of caretakers. 

In 1909, the Secretary of War (Mr. Dickinson) quoted in his annual 
report a memorandum of the General Staff as to the distribution of 
the Army, which invited attention to the extravagance and ineffi- 
ciency caused by the past policy. This study was the first concrete 
exhibit of the subject, which Mr. Dickinson considered of vital im- 
portance. He asked that calculation be made determining the 
approximate amount that would be saved and the increased efficiency 
that might be expected from the proposed change in order that he 
might submit definite recommendation for action. These calcula- 
tions were made and have been furnished the present head of the 
War Department. Three posts were abandoned during Mr. Dickin- 
son's incumbency as Secretary of War. 

The present Secretary of War is taking steps to provide for the 
economic administration of the forces in our insular possessions and 
in the Canal Zone. A special board of General Staff officers has been 
appointed to make definite recommendations as to the distribution of 
the mobile Army. As an example of its work it may be stated that 
the board, in determining the garrison for Oahu, pointed the way to 
a plan of post for six regiments on that island, which will cost half a 
milhon less than a post in the United States constructed, under the 
old system, for three regiments. Similar consideration is being 
given the garrisons for the Philippine Islands and the Canal Zone. 

In short, it may be stated that there has been a definite and natural 
evolution in the policy of Army distribution. The initial distribu- 
tion was determined by the requirements of Indian warfare, and for 
some time after this distribution ceased to be necessary the person- 
nel of the Army was still influenced by old traditions and old ideals. 
The movement toward concentration began to make itself felt before 
the Spanish-American War, but was arrested by the necessity of 
providing for an increased Army before suitable new stations could 
be provided. The demand for concentration first found expression 
in the demand for the battalion post instead of the old company post, 
and then for the regimental post instead of the battalion station. 
The demand in each case was based upon sound tactional and economic 
principles and in each case was a step toward the ideal solution. 
Later and more scientific study of the problem has pointed out that 
a mobile Army should be trained as a team of all arms and that any 
dispersion which prevents such training is made at the expense of 
efficiency and economy. This evolution has taken place in the Army 
itself, and the Army can not blame any other institution or persons 
for gradual development which is characteristic of evolution. 

(8) A full statement of the serious difficulties anticipated bj the 
department in carrying out the policies of economy and efficiency in 
respect to the subject matter of this inquiry: 

The most serious difficulties anticipated by the department in car- 
rying out the proposed policies are the following: 



THE MOBILB AHMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 13 

First. The opposition of communities to the abandonment ot Army 
posts located in their Yicinity. 

Second. The largo orighial outlay probably necessary to estabhsh 
the proposed system of locating garrisons at places that are strategi- 
cally important. 

Third. The difficulty of obtaining a fair value for the buildings and 
land pertaining to the abandoned posts. 

As to the first difficulty, past exeprience shows that it is in general 
a difficult matter for the War Department to abandon posts situated 
in the vicinity of cities. Posts so situated are a source of revenue to 
the business men of the community through the articles purchased by 
officers and men and the supplies obtained by the Quartermaster's 
and Subsistence Departments for the upkeep of the post. The post 
itself serves as a recreation park for the citizens, where they can hsten 
to a band concert and watch the various drills of the troops. For 
these reasons it is only natural that communities should resist vigor- 
ously the abandonment of posts situated in their vicinity and that 
their Representatives in the Congress should do all in their power to 
carry out the v/ishes of their constituents. Against such practical 
and plainly evident reasons for the maintenance of a post near his 
home town the average citizen is apt to attach little importance to 
projects based on purely miUtary necessity and in wliich he is apt to 
take but very little interest. 

The second serious difficulty arises from the strong opposition to 
be expected from the people to the relatively large original outlay 
that will be necessary to put into execution the proposed policy 
of locating garrisons for strategical reasons only. Although it can 
be shown that such a system will result in ultimate economy, to 
say nothing of increased efficiency, strong opposition may be expected 
to any project that will even temporarily increase the already large 
expenditures for the support of the Army. The principal item of 
tills increased cost will be the expenditure necessary for the enlarge- 
ment of the posts already located in places that are deemed of 
strategic importance, in orcler to accommodate the garrisons removed 
from the abandoned posts, and for the construction of new posts 
at strategic points at which no garrisons are at present maintained. 
The development of this policy would have to be a gradual one, and, 
as a rule, the outlay for any particular year would not be great. 

As to the third difficulty, it may be said that the cost of putting 
into execution the proposed policy will be greatly reduced in the 
end by the proceeds resulting from the sale of the buildings and 
land pertaining to the abandoned posts and other military reser- 
vations. For the posts situated in the vicinity of cities, it may be 
anticipated that there will be no difficulty in selling the officers' 
quarters for suburban residences and in disposing of the land for 
building lots, but there are a number of buildings at every Army 
post, such as barracks, riding halls, gun sheds, post exchange, and 
administration buildings, that will be difficult to dispose of for 

E rices that will bear any relation to their original cost. Sewer and 
ghting systems would probably find no purchasers unless the whole 
post were taken over by a corporation and o]>erated after the man- 
ner of a suburban residence park. Values in some cases would 
also be affected by the class of undesirable citizens that have settled 
in the vicinity of large posts since the abohshment of the canteen. 



14 THE MOBILE AHMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

It should be borne in mind, however, that the increased value of 
the land in many cases will tend to offset the loss in value of build- 
ings and other improvements. 

(9) The names and cost of Army posts which have been abandoned 
during the 10 years ending June 30, 1911: 

Total cost to date. 

Fort Assiniboine, Mont .|915, 178. 30 

Benicia Barracks, Cal 27, 139. 80 

Fort Brown, Tex 246, 787. 32 

Fort Duchesne, Utah 179, 196. 69 

Eagle Pass, Tex Unknown . 

Fort Grant, Ariz 79,568.07 

Fort Niobrara, Nebr 143, 458. 95 

Fort Ringgold, Tex 98, 724. 70 

San Diego Barracks, Cal 7, 134. 21 

Fort Thomas, Ky 626, 965. 78 

Fort Walla Walla, Wash 362, 829. 24 

Fort Washakie, Wvo 44, 206. 32 

Fort Wingate, N. Mex 327, 672. 03 

3, 058, 861. 41 

The names and cost of all Army posts which would have to be 
abandoned in order to put an end to the extravagance and ineffi- 
ciency resulting from improper distribution of the mobile Army: 

(a) The following posts should be abandoned as soon as suitable 
provision can be made elsewhere for their garrisons : 

Total cost to date. 

Fort Apache, Ariz.' $73, 639. 07 

Boise Barracks, Idaho 398, 049. 73 

Fort Brady, Mich 445, 104. 17 

Fort Clark, Tex 138, 748. 23 

Fort George Wright, Wash 694, 854. 32 

Fort Jay, N. Y. (mobile garrison only) - 213, 592. 84 

Fort Lincoln, N. Dak '. 618, 459. 27 

Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark 428, 136. 67 

Fort Mcintosh, Tex 224, 028. 50 

Fort Mackenzie, Wvo 1 , 218, 966. 00 

Madison Barracks, N. Y (552, 934. 39 

Fort Meade, S. Dak 1 , 225, 787. 93 

Fort Niagara, N . Y 428, 547. 85 

Fort Ontario, N. Y ;«7, 637. 50 

Fort Wayne, Mich 542, 354. 62 

Whipple Barracks, Ariz 002, 015. 69 

Fort Wm. Henry Harrison, Mont 178, 882. 58 

Fort Yellowstone, Wyo 806, 511. 51 

(h) The following posts are not located with a view of securing 
economy of administration and supply or a full measure of military 
effectiveness. Their garrisons should not be increased and should 
ultimately be withdrawn to such concentration centers as Congress 
may authorize: 

1 A possibility of Indian trouble near this post still exists. 

* Not suitable for mobile troops, but sliould be retained as headquarters of the eastern division and as 
the site of the Eastern Military Prison. 



THE MOBILE AKMY OE THE UNITED STATES. 15 

Total cost to date. 

Fort Ethan Allen, Vt $1, 007, 459. 61 

Platteburg Barracks, N. Y 938, 647. 33 

Fort Robinson, Nebr 1, 071, 122. 28 

Fort Missoula, Mont 593, 941. 00 

Fort Logan, Colo 819, 253. 85 

Fort Douglas, Utah.. 919,229.71 

(Salt Lake City is a strategic point on account of the railway radia- 
tion, but this in itself is not sufficient reason for stationing a regiment 
at Fort Douglas. Such a regiment must forfeit opportunities of 
field training in combination with the other arms (Cavalry and 
Field Artillery), except at heavy expense for rail transportation.) 

Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo 4, 925, 486. 15 

(This post is not located with a view to maximum economy or 
strategic effectiveness. Its position in a sparsely settled region in- 
volves an increased cost for transportation of manufactured sup- 
plies, and its distance from recruiting centers makes the recruitment 
of its garrison more costly. But there are sufficient quarters at 
the post for a detachment of all arms, with ample facilities for train- 
ing. There is an abundant water supply at the post, and climate 
and sanitary conditions are excellent. There is a large maneuver 
ground within easy marching distance of the post.) 

The fact that a post is located upon a possible line of operations 
is sometimes offered as an index of strategic location. For example, 
Plattsburg Barracks may be said to be strategically located because 
it is on a natural hne of advance from Canada. But this is itself is 
no justification for placing a peace garrison at Plattsburg. If the 
troops of this and other similar garrisons were assembled in a large 
command at some central point, as Albany, they would be better 
instructed, because they would have teamwork with other arms, their 
administration and supply would be just as available for use at Platts- 
burg in the event of war as they are now, and much more available 
for employment at all other places. The attempt to permanently 
scatter troops so as to cover all possible lines of advance results in 
dispersion which is as fatal to economy as it is to tactical and strategi- 
cal effectiveness. 

(10) The estimated annual saving in money wdiich would follow 
an efficient and economical distribution of the mobile Army, assum- 
ing said Army to remain at its present size, and the estimated increase 
in number of officers and men which could efficiently be made in the 
mobile Army were it properly distributed within the present annual 
cost of maintaining the Army : 

The following estimate of saving is made on the assumption that 
the entire mobile Army serving within the United States proper is 
concentrated in 8 large posts of approximately equal size and located 
at centers of transportation and supply, instead of in 49 posts of 
various sizes not generally so located. It is not claimed that it is 
accurate or based on anything except the opinions of officers who have 
given the matter their best thought. Following the table under 
each appropriation are notes which will serve to indicate the method 
pursued in determining the percentage of saving to be assumed. 



16 



THE MOBILE ABMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



Quartermaster's Department. 
REGULAR SUPPLIES. 



Items. 



Chargeable to 

mobile Army 

in United 

States. 



Esti- 
mated 

per- 
centage. 



Saving. 



Care and protection of supplies 

Stoves, offices, barracks, etc 

Heating apparatus 

Repairs and maintenance, heating apparatus. 

Heating, barracks and quarters 

Lighting 

Ice machines, maintenance 

Cold storage 

Stationery 

Typewriters 

Printing (orders, etc.) 



Total. 



$86,000.00 

5,000.00 

95,260.00 

51,500.00 

1,134,000.00 

619,000.00 

6,000.00 

5,700.00 

55,000.00 

10,000.00 

28,000.00 



$51,r0O.00 

3,000.00 

28,578.00 

15, 450. 00 

556,800.00 

309,500.00 

4, 800. 00 

4,560.00 

33,000.00 

6,000.00 

16,800.00 



1,030,088.00 



The heating and hghting are the two greatest savings estimated. 
It is beheved the estimate of 50 per cent of saving is conservative for 
the following reasons : 

1. The number of administration buildings, guardhouses, fire sta- 
tions, and similar buildings would be reduced 83 per cent. 

2. Buildings would be more compactly arranged. 

3. A few central heating plants would be used instead of separately 
heated buildings. 

4. Fuel would be cheaper purchased in large quantities and at great 
centers of supply. 

The same holds for lighting, with the additional fact that the exterior 
lighting of our present large reservations would be discontinued. 

The greatest percentage of saving assumed (80 per cent) is on main- 
tenance of ice macliines and on cold storage. TJiese items would be 
little more for a large post than for a small one. The other items may 
be similarly considered, remembering that there would be only one- 
sixth of the number of posts and administrative offices, and that many 
matters now subjects of correspondence would be attended to by 
memorandum or personal instruction. 

INCIDENTAL EXPENSES. 



Items. 



Chargeable to 

mobile Army 

iB United 

States. 



Esti- 
mated 

per- 
centage. 



Saving. 



Postage 

Telegrams and telephones 

Extra duty: 

Barracks and quarters 

Roads 

Clerks 

Overseers 

Office furniture 

Laborers 

Clerks, Quartermaster's Departnieit . 

Other employees 

Blacksmith tools 

Additional expenses 



$2,600.00 
67, 000. 00 

4, 000. 00 
56, 000. 00 
12,000.00 
10, 000. 00 
17,000.00 
69, 000. 00 
588, 000. 00 
258,000.00 
l.'^, 000. 00 
65,000.00 



Total. 



$1,300.00 
40, 200. 00 

3,200.00 

44,000.00 

7, 200. 00 

8,000.00 

8,500.00 

48, 300. 00 

294,000.00 

129,000.00 

6, 500. 00 

32, .500. no 

C22, 700. 00 



THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



17 



The greatest item is for clerks and other employees, Quartermaster's 
Department. For clerks approximately $300,000 saving is esti- 
mated. 

The consolidation of the chief quartermaster's oflices of six depart- 
ments into three divisions resulted in the past year in a saving of 
$20,000 on clerks, and a saving of $30,000 is estimated this year. 

It would seem reasonable to assume the consolidation of 49 post 
supply offices into 8, with the accompanying reduction of worK at 
Army and division headquarters, would result in a reduction of 50 per 
cent in the clerical force. There would be only 16 per cent of the 
offices to correspond with, 16 per cent of the estimates, requisitions, 
returns, and similar papers. 

The 80 per cent savmg estimated on extra-duty men is believed con- 
servative. In fact, it is believed that this item would almost disap- 
pear in a concentrated post constructed on simple lines. 

BARRACKS AND QUARTERS. 



Items. 



Chargeable to 

mobile Army 

in United 

States. 



Esti- 
mated 
per- 
centage. 



Saving. 



Repairs 

Extra duty 

Civilian employees. 
W indo w shades 



$.572,000.00 
7,000.00 
73,000.00 
3,000.00 



Total. 



$286,000.00 

3,500.00 

36,500.00 

1,000.00 



327,000.00 



Initial construction was not considered. The posts now in the 
United States have cost approximately $95,000,000. It has been 
determined by the board which drew up the plan for a concentrated 
post on Oahu that under the concentration system the construction 
would cost approximately one-half this amount. 



ARMY TRANSPORTATION. 



Items. 



Chargeable to 

mobile Army 

in United 

states. 



Esti- 
mated 
per- 
centage. 



Saving. 



Changing station: 

1. Transportation 

2. Impedimenta 

3. Animals 

4. Horses of officers 

5. Officers, enlisted men, and civUians, including baggage. 

6. Packing and crating 

7. Supplies 

Recruits 

Agents of the various departments 

Quartermaster stores other than clothing 

Subsistence stores 

Horse equipments 

Ordnance 

Animals 

Funds. 



Repairs to harness (purchase of tools, etc.). 

Repairs to wagons, etc 

Carts 

Employees 

Drayage 



,185,000.00 

155,000.00 

70,000.00 

14,000.00 

138,000.00 

49,000.00 

86, 000. 00 

375,000.00 

62.000.00 

529,000.00 

346, 000. 00 

3,000.00 

190,000.00 

214,000.00 

8,000.00 

16,000.00 

75,000.00 

5,400.00 

907,000.00 

45,000.00 



Total. 



$711, 

103, 

42, 

8, 

82, 

29, 

51, 

112, 

43, 

476, 

311, 

2, 

48, 

50. 

2, 

8, 

37, 

4, 

193, 

22, 



000.00 
000. 00 
000.00 
400.00 
800.00 
400.00 
600.00 
500.00 
400.00 
100.00 
400.00 
700.00 
000.00 
350.00 
000.00 
000.00 
500.00 
320.00 
400.00 
500.00 



2,240,370.00 



H. Doc. 490, 62-2- 



18 



THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



The greatest saving is that on changing of stations which are esti- 
mated as 60 per cent. With the permanent foreign garrisons and the 
concentration of the Army, it is beUeved that changes of station will 
be rare and that this estimate is very conservative. The greatest 
percentage assumed is 90 per cent on transportation of supplies. If 
the concentration stations are well selected the reduction will be all 
of this and probably greater, since the posts themselves will make the 
market if it does not already exist in sufficient development. The 
saving on ordnance stores is taken as only 25 per cent, as these can 
not be purchased locally; this estimate is based on reduced freight 
expenses — the delivery to 8 large railroad centers instead of to 49 
scattered and, in cases, isolated posts. No savings on the purchase 
of wagons, and only 20 per cent on employees was estimated, as it is 
presumed that the Field Service Regulations allowance of transpor- 
tation and teamsters would be maintained. 

WATER AND SEWERS. 



Items. 



Procuring water ' 

Introducing to posts 

Fire apparatus 

Repairs to above 

Disposal of sewage 

Repair of water systems. 

Repair of plumbing 

Repair of sewers 

Employees 



Total. 



Chargeable to 

mobile Army 

in United 

states. 



$414,000.00 
13,000.00 
30, 000. 00 
12,000.00 
,50,000.00 
63,000.00 
93.000.00 
4S,000.00 
212,000.00 



Esti- 
mated 
per- 
centage. 



Saving. 



$207,000.00 

7,800.00 

18,000.00 

7,200.00 

15,000.00 

31,500.00 

18, 600. 00 

24,000.00 

106,000.00 



435,100.00 



1 This includes pav of laborers, sinking of wells, sterilization, construction and enlargement of piunping 
plants, purchase of fuel for such plants, and payment for water obtained from other than military plants. 

The greatest saving is on procuring water. Since a water system 
for a large post would not be proportionally greater in cost of oper- 
ation than one for a small post, and the concentrated garrison system 
would do away with the extensive lawns, gardens, and roads to be 
watered, the estimated saving is thought conservative. The intro- 
duction of water to 8 large post§ v/ould certainly cost not more than 
40 per cent as much as its introduction to 49 small posts. Only 20 
per cent reduction was estimated on repairs to plumbing, as it was 
thought the 8 large posts would have approximately 80 per cent 
the fixtures now in the 49 small posts. 

CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF HOSPITALS. 



Item. 



Repairs. 



Chargeable 

to mobile 

Army in 

United 

States. 



$160,000.00 



Esti- 
mated 
percent- 



50 



Saving. 



$80,000.00 



THE MOBILE AEMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



19 



Repairs to 8 large hospitals would hardly be gi'eater than half 
those to 49 smaller hospitals. 



SHOOTING GALLERIES AND RANGES. 



Item. 


Chargeable 

to mobile 

Army in 

United 

States. 


Esti- 
mated 
percent- 
age. 


Saving. 


Shelter 


$48,000.00 


50 


$24,000.00 







Change from 49 small to 8 large posts. 

MILITARY POST EXCH.\NGES. 



Item. 


Chargeable 

to mobile 

Army in 

United 

States. 


Esti- 
mated 
percent- 
age. 


Saving. 




$22,000.00 


50 


$11,000.00 







Change from 49 small to 8 large posts. 

ROADS, WALKS, WHARVES, AND DRAINAGE. 



Items. 



Chargeabls 

to mobile 

Armv in 

United 

States. 



Esti- 
mated 
percent- 



Saving. 



Road construction 

Road repair 

Walk construction 

Walls repair 

Enlisted men at work on roads 

Other employees on roads, wharves, and drainage. 

Drainage. ..." 

Improvement of grounds 



Total. 



$144,350.00 
50,000.00 
15,000.00 
20,000.00 
3,000.00 
20,000.00 
12,000.00 
62,000.00 



5115,480.00 
40,000.00 
12,000.00 
16,000.00 

2,400.00 
10,000.00 

9,600.00 
49,600.00 



265,080.00 



Roads and walks would practically disappear with the parklike 
reservations. "Improvements to grounds" would be similarly 
reduced in importance. 

RECAPITULATION FOR QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT. 



Appropriation. 



Estimated 
savings. 



Regular supplies 

Incidental expenses 

Barracks and quarters 

Army transportation 

Water and sewers 

Hospitals 

Shooting galleries and ranges 

Military post exchanges 

Roads,"walks, wharves, and drainage 

Total for Qunrtermaster's Department 



030,088.00 
622. 700. 00 
327,000.00 
240,370.00 
435,100.00 
80,000.00 
24,000.00 
11,000.00 
265,080.00 



5,03.5,338.00 



20 



THE MOBILE AEMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Subsistence Department. 



Items. 



Estimated 
chargeable to 
mobile Army 

in United 
States. 



Esti- 
mated 
percent- 
age. 



Saving. 



Ration articles 

Hot coffee for troops traveling 

Bake ovens and apparatus 

Subsistence property (other than cooking apparatus and field 

ranges) 

Compensation to civilian employees other than transport service 

Extra duty 

Wastage in issue and transportation ! . . . 



,711,028.00 
5,000.00 
10,700.00 

38,000.00 

110,000.00 

30,000.00 

15,000.00 



Total. 



$148,441.00 
2,500.00 
6,420.00 

15,200.00 

22,000.00 

24,000.00 

1,500.00 



220,061.00 



The greatest saving is on ration articles. This saving, estimated 
as 4 per cent, is based on competition that would result from the 
local purchase of supphes in such large quantities. The highest 
percentage is on extra-duty pay, resulting from the change from 49 
posts to 8. The great saving in transportation has been considered 
under the Quartermaster's Department. 

Medical Department. 



Items. 



Estimated 
chargeable to 
mobile Army 

in United 
States. 



Esti- 
mated 
percent- 



Saving. 



Medical and hospital supplies. 

Hospital matrons 

B ospital nurses 



S200, 000. 00 
3,000.00 
20. 000. 00 



Total 



$80,000.00 
1,800.00 
12,000.00 



93, 800. 00 



There are many expensive appliances wliich are necessary at all 
hospitals, regardless of size. There are many hospitals wliich are but 
rarely used. In some cases the large hospital requires no more than 
the small, and the purchase of such articles could be reduced about 
80 per cent; the estimate of 40 per cent on supplies in general is 
therefore thought conservative. 

Pay Department. 



Items. 



Savings esti- 
mated. 



Mileage: 

Inspection by— 

1. Department and division commanders 

2. Inspector General's Department 

3. Quartermaster's Department 

4. Subsistence Department 

5. Medical Department 

6. Ordnance Department 

Returning from conducting recruits 

Examination for promotion 

Changes of station 

Courts-martial 

Horsemanship tests 

Payment of troops 

Travel for dental and medical treatment 

Total mileage..... 



$1,000.00 
2, 500. 00 
5,500.00 
500.00 
800.00 
2,400.00 
4,000.00 
9,000.00 

66,600.00 
6.000.00 
2,000.00 

18,000.00 
6,000.00 



124,300.00 



THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 21 

Pay Department — Continued . 



Items. 



Officers returned to duty with the line (6). 

Clerks (6) 

Messengers (7) 



Total for Pay Department. 



Savings esti- 
mated. 



$_>I,(100.00 
9,000.00 
4,200.00 



34,800.00 



159,100.00 



ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT AND SIGNAL CORPS. 

While there might be some saving on clerical assistance, it is believed 
that it would be too small to warrant consideration. The saving on 
mileage has been included under the Pay Department. 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS. 

It is not believed that any saving would result in this corps on 
account of the concentration. 

ADJUTANT general's DEPARTMENT. 

The work of this department would be simplified by such a reduc- 
tion in administrative units and the clerical force could be reduced 
so as to to effect a large saving. 

RECAPITULATION. 

The estimates herein made were based upon the assumption of a 
concentration in eight strategic areas, using such data as were imme- 
diately available. They are believed to be conservative. 

Quartermaster's Department $5, 036, 138 

Subsistence Department 220, 000 

Medical Department 91 , 800 

Pay Department 159, 100 

Total estimate 5, 507, 038 

In reference to the last clause of subdivision 10 of your resolution, 
I beg to say that this saving would, if devoted to military purposes, 
enable 10 regiments of Infantry, with an enlisted strength of 900 men 
each, to be added to the mobile Army. This allows $500 as an average 
annual cost for each enlisted man and nearly $900,000 per year for 
overhead charges, due to the increased administration expenses. 

Or it would enable each company, troop, and battery of the mobile 
Army to be increased by 20 privates, allowdng $500 per year per man. 
The usual estimate of $1,100 per rifle is erroneous, as it charges to 
the enlisted man the full cost of maintenance of the Army, while 
over 50 per cent of this cost is not affected by an increase or decrease 
in the enlisted force. 

Or it would pay the "cost of 100,000 reservists at an annual cost of 
$55 per man, a number sufficient to bring the entire mobile Army 
to war strength and to form the necessary depot battahon from 



22 THE MOBILE ARMY OF THE UltlTED STATES. 

which losses would be replaced, thus doing away with the necessity 
for filHng the ranks of the highly trained organizations with raw 
recruits in an emergency requiring the highest state of efficiency in 
our first line of defense. 

In addition to this actual increase in numbers, there would be an 
increase in effective officers and men by returning to duty those 
now on extra and special duty. This is estimated as 5 per cent of 
the strength. The reduction in men required for guard and fatigue 
duties would add an additional. 5 per cent to the number available 
for daily training. In event of a sudden call the number of men 
available to take the field would be between 5 and 10 per cent greater 
than at present, as there would not be necessary tha many detach- 
ments of caretakers. This would be more marked in the Medical 
Department than in the line, since each of the 49 post hospitals would 
have to be kept in operation for the care of the sick, who could not 
be abandoned, while under the concentrated system there would be 
but 8 hospitals to be continued. 

The great items of pay and clothing are not affected at all by the 
redistributions, and the subsistence only slightly. The expenses of 
the Coast Artillery Corps are unchanged, and the foreign garrisons 
have not been considered. 

With reference to the foreign garrisons, it might be stated that the 
plan for concentration is now being put into effect in the insular 
possessions and Panama. The necessity for increasing the garrison 
of Oahu and for estabhshing that in the Canal Zone would have 
caused a great increase in the transport service had the system of 
changing regiments and scattered garrisons been continued. With 
the changes already approved and those under consideration it is 
believed that the water transportation for all these garrisons will 
cost little if any more than the cost in the past for the Philippine 
garrison alone. While this will not decrease expenses, it will pre- 
vent an otherwise necessary increase. 

In so far as it has been practicable the principle of concentration 
has been put in operation for the Coast Artillery, and the result has 
been increased economy, ease, and efficiency of administration. 

Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 





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